World Economic Outlook, September 2002: Trade and Finance

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  3. Características digitales
  4. Canales de reciclaje internacional de los petrodólares

Yet the region is expected to grow by 4. A second important change recorded during the last decade concerns income distribution. In contrast to the growing polarisation observed during the s and s, between and income inequality declined in almost every county of the region.

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CrossRef Google Scholar. Google Scholar. Barrientos, A. Journal of Latin American Studies 41 1 : 1— Bouillon, C. Braun, M.

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Bell, J. Duloy and R. Cornia, G. Journal of Human Development 11 1 : 85— Dornbusch, R. Fiszbein, A. Frenkel, R. International Review of Applied Economics 22 2 : — Gasparini, L. Farm trade is projected to remain highly concentrated, with just five main exporters accounting for as much as 70 per cent of total exports—and with trade in some commodities being dominated by an even smaller number of countries.

According to a report by the WTO Secretariat, WTO members applied new trade-restrictive measures between mid-October and mid-May , amounting to 22 new measures per month—the highest monthly average registered since WTO, Agriculture has been an important focus of these trade-restrictive measures. According to the WTO Trade Monitoring Database, which has collected trade measures implemented by WTO members and observers since , more than 20 per cent of all the measures documented between and targeted agricultural products.

Overall, trade-restrictive measures were identified during the price spikes period. Between and , this number almost doubled to , with more than a quarter of the identified measures directly affecting the trade interests of least developed countries LDCs , according to the GTA. Obviously, the numerical counting of such measures and programmes is only a very rough indicator. It does not imply that the identified measures are illegal from a WTO perspective, nor does it provide any indication regarding their potential impact.

It illustrates, however, a significant change in the use of policy tools between the two periods, partly confirming the above hypothesis of a move towards more market access barriers and state aid in times of declining food prices. Figure 3: Trade-restrictive measures implemented on agriculture and fish products.

It is too early to tell whether this reflects short-term contingency measures or, instead, a deeper change in agricultural policy orientations.

However, several of these measures could already have significant impacts on third countries. In July of the same year, this was further complemented by an additional envelope worth EUR million from EU funds to support the dairy market EC, Similarly, Figure 3 shows a significant increase in the use of market access barriers, in the form of import tariffs, import bans or quotas, and trade remedy measures such as anti-dumping, countervailing duties or safeguard measures. It illustrates not only the wide distribution of protectionist pressures in agriculture but also the preponderance of major players in the implementation of such measures.

Figure 4: Top 20 countries applying trade-restrictive measures between and Number of measures imposed per country. To do so, we review measures applied to cereals, oils, sugar and dairy, given the relatively steep price drop these products have experienced, falling between 35 per cent and 48 per cent compared to their peak value, as illustrated in Table 1, above. The data also show how import-liberalising measures largely surpassed import restrictions during the price spikes period between and , as governments struggled to provide affordable food for their consumers by temporarily removing trade barriers.

Interestingly, trade- restrictive import measures applied to cereals, oils, sugar and dairy accounted for nearly 60 per cent of total trade-restrictive measures applied to agriculture, pointing once again to a probable link with the decline in commodity prices.

While trade-liberalising import measures also grew significantly post, a closer look shows that the countries implementing them were not the same as those imposing trade restrictions. While the main liberalising countries included relatively competitive producers like Brazil or Mexico, or large importers and developed countries or blocs such as the EU or Korea, countries imposing restrictions were essentially large developing countries and blocs such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, SACU, Argentina, Nigeria, China or Indonesia.

Figure 5: Trade measures applied to cereals, oils, sugar and dairy products. The cut in MFN applied duties was especially steep for developing countries, [falling] from an average of 31 percent to 23 percent, with preferential applied tariffs going down to 20 percent in However, low prices might put pressure on policymakers to apply temporary protection, or to simply undo some of the unilateral reforms implemented in recent years but not consolidated in international commitments. Closely related to price fluctuation is the problem of import surges—generally defined as sharp temporary rises in import volumes above a trend level, potentially threatening otherwise viable and efficient domestic sectors.

For many countries that remain price takers in world markets, the return to declining prices will likely increase internal political pressures to use border protection to counteract the transmission of distortions in world prices and protect import-competing sectors. This hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the significant increase in the use of unilateral temporary import tariffs, quotas, bans or trade remedies since , as highlighted in Figures 3 and 5.

Such a mechanism would enable developing countries to protect their domestic producers from import surges and price declines by temporarily raising their agricultural tariffs. To be effective, such an SSM should be easy to apply for developing countries already struggling with the complexity of existing trade remedy mechanisms in the WTO. Between and , the incidence of import surges declined significantly, while cases of price depression fell nearly to zero for most commodities Morrison and Mermigkas, , reducing considerably the pressure and arguably the justification for an SSM.

The return to periods of declining prices will probably result in renewed political pressure to negotiate some sort of contingency tariff protection to deal with price depression. Arguably, resistance to lowering trade barriers on imports is likely to be fuelled further by the resurgence of agricultural subsidies in both developed and emerging economies, as such subsidies artificially lower world prices. This phenomenon is examined further in the section below. Figure 6: Trends in international prices of major agricultural commodities.

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  • In the meantime, trade-distorting payments in the EU, US and Japan have been declining—at least compared to the level they reached at the end of the Uruguay Round—leading to a trend of growing convergence between support levels in large, developed countries and emerging economies. Figure 7 illustrates this evolution by looking at the OECD producer support estimates PSE 17 expressed as a share of gross farm receipts since While it shows slightly declining levels in the EU, Japan and the US, support as a share of gross farm income in China or Indonesia more than doubled over the last 5 years or so, reaching levels similar to those observed in the EU.

    At the policy level, successive reforms in the EU progressively replaced highly trade-distorting price support with more decoupled income support payments. In the case of the US, decoupled payments replaced certain more distorting instruments in the Farm Bill; however, overall, total payments shrank as world prices went up, triggering lower levels of support under programmes such as countercyclical payments.

    In the US, the Farm Bill 18 eliminated several direct payments that had been classed as not more than minimally trade-distorting, and replaced them with subsidised insurance schemes that protect farmers from yield and price variation risks, thereby inducing potentially significant trade distortions Glauber and Effland, ; Lau et al.

    Características digitales

    As a result, coupled aid has started to grow again, from less than EUR 3 billion in to nearly EUR 5 billion in Matthews, Figure 8 looks more specifically at the case of China, and shows how producer support has increased in recent years, particularly for commodities like sugar, soybean, maize and milk. In the case of rice, policy even evolved from a situation in which farmers received negative support i. Figure 8: China: Single commodity transfers as a share of commodity gross farm receipts. It rather reflects broader long-term concerns linked to specific domestic circumstances.

    As emerging economies have started accumulating larger resources through which to provide state aid, domestic support programmes in agriculture have grown significantly, mostly in the form of price support policies, non-product-specific input subsidies, or investment aids. These schemes are often supported by government-run stockholding programmes for food security and by public distribution systems e. India, China or Pakistan. However, as shown in Figure 9 for the case of wheat, when international prices started to fall, minimum guaranteed price levels continued to increase, thereby keeping domestic prices higher than world levels, with potentially important trade-distorting effects.

    Figure 9: International wheat prices and the evolution of minimum guaranteed price schemes in China, India and Pakistan.

    Canales de reciclaje internacional de los petrodólares

    Contrary to a situation in which prices are high, governments may be more reluctant to undertake reforms when faced with political pressure from domestic producers to increase support in the sector and not reduce it. Exporters of agricultural products, on the other hand, will likely argue that this new price environment makes further reform all the more urgent, and insist on the need to achieve meaningful results in the negotiations.

    These developments can be seen to have contributed to a fall in the use of export subsidies and other measures with comparable effects, with export subsidies in the EU alone falling from over EUR 10 billion per annum in the early s to almost zero today, and to a decline in the volumes of in-kind food aid as donors move increasingly towards cash-based food assistance Díaz-Bonilla and Hepburn, ; Clay, However, with the use of export competition instruments continuing in the s, many countries wanted to establish stronger global rules to protect their farmers and agricultural exporters.

    While recourse to export subsidies made little sense during the price spikes period with the exception of certain products for which expensive fuel constituted a large share of the input costs , the return to low prices could have resulted in countries reactivating their export subsidy programmes. Although some countries sought to fast track an outcome in this area in and again in , the EU in particular continued to insist that any export competition outcome should be linked to progress in other areas.

    Trade ministers agreed to phase out export subsidies, and not to increase them above current levels. New rules on international food aid were also agreed that sought to ensure it remained available in emergencies, but did not function as a disguised export subsidy. Finally, generic language on exporting state trading enterprises required countries not to use these bodies to circumvent their export subsidy commitments. However, it is clearly the result of concerted efforts, over the long term, to address the trade-distorting effects of specific instruments associated with structural overproduction and the implications these may have for domestic markets.